Abstract
One of the main goals of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is the preservation of or increase in the income of agricultural households and businesses. Such goal is fulfi lled by a whole spectrum of instruments, from direct payments within the fi rst pillar of CAP, to various agroenvironmental subsidies within the second pillar. Such instruments, besides aff ecting the total income of households or the profi t of companies, also aff ect the level of agricultural production and costs, prices, as well as farm structure (Henningsen et al., 2011; Malá et al., 2011) . Witzke and Noleppa (2006) emphasize that two basic variables, which measure the eff ectiveness of public policy, is the rate of allocation and redistribution eff ects. Allanson (2004) considers the redistribution eff ect of agricultural policy to be the diff erence between the rate of inequality in income including subsidies and the rate of inequality in income a er the deduction of subsidies. In terms of the development of CAP, according to Schmid et al. (2006b) the introduction of direct payments, which replaced price subvention, and their gradual separation from production, meant a shi from allocation policy toward a redistribution policy.
Payments of an operative nature provided to farmers in the Czech Republic are currently largely comprised of a revenue subsidy that is provided per hectare of land. Such payment is separated from production and Schmid et al. (2006) state that payments that are separated from production have a minimal allocation eff ect or none at all and that they can be considered an instrument of purely redistributionary policy. On the other hand, revenue subsidies that are on a per animal basis or a unit of production basically intervene in the market and aff ect the allocation of resources.
The question thus is whether subsidies within CAP, as instruments of predominantly redistributionary policy, truly contribute to the reduction of inequalities in income of agricultural businesses or not.
A whole range of studies focus on the issue of the impact of the distribution of subsidies within CAP, and such studies may be divided up into two groups. The fi rst group only focuses on the matter of the distribution of agricultural subsidies, e.g. according to geographical areas (Alfaro-Navarro, 2011; Schmid et al., 2006a) . The second group of publications focuses on the impact of subsidies under Common Agricultural Policy on the distribution of income (Keeney, 2000; Frawley and Keeney, 2000; Schmid et al., 2006a Schmid et al., , 2006b Witzke and Noleppa, 2006; Benni and Finger, 2012) .
As far as the issue of unequal distribution of subsidies is concerned, the literature shows that the majority of payments go to the largest businesses, generally to the largest land users. Schmid et al. (2006a) state that in 2001, in the average for 14 EU countries, 80% of direct payments went to only 20% of businesses.
In terms of the impact of subsidies on the distribution of the income of agricultural households or businesses, the results vary signifi cantly. For example, Keeney (2000) conducted a decomposition of the Gini coeffi cient of the income of agricultural households in Ireland into two components -direct payments and income generated by the market. Keeney reached the conclusion that the introduction of direct payments by way of MacSharry's reform contributed to the more balanced income distribution of agricultural households. Authors such as Mishra et al. (2009) , Moreddu (2011) or Benni and Finger (2012) , for example, also reach the conclusion that subsidies contribute to a reduction in the inequality of income of agricultural households. Schmid et al. (2006b) analyzes the income of agricultural households included in the FADN accounting data network for the period of [2001] [2002] [2003] . However, Schmid reaches the conclusion that payments for natural disadvantage only have a minimal eff ect on the level of absolute income inequality in Austria. While direct payments and agro-environmental subsidies increase absolute income inequality, because primarily direct payments grow proportionally to their size. Schmid emphasizes that businesses of a larger size have a double advantage, with subsidies growing proportionally with their size, as well as with savings from economies of scale.
The predominant portion of the literature analyzes the impact of subsidies on the income of agricultural households, but Witzke and Noleppa (2006) also examined the impact of subsidies on the profi t of German businesses (legal entities). However, their analysis, which also utilizes FADN data, is not based on individual data, but on average values for groups of businesses, which were arranged according to the profi t per business indicator. Witzke and Noleppa (2006) , similarly to Keeney (2000) , decompile the absolute inequality measured by the Gini coeffi cient into direct payments and profi t generated by the market, or, in other words, profi t a er the deduction of direct payments. The authors reach the conclusion that the majority of businesses (legal entities) would generate a negative profi t in the absence of direct payments, subsidies comprise a signifi cant part of their profi t, and thus their absolute contribution to the overall inequality is signifi cant -approximately ¾ of the overall inequality.
The main objective of the submitted article is to analyze the inequality in the distribution of the economic result among businesses engaging in fi eld production in the Czech Republic and to assess the impact of subsidies on the said inequality, as the economic activity of fi eld production businesses is signifi cantly aff ected by subsidies provided within CAP in view of their ties to agricultural land. A partial objective is the assessment of the eff ect of selected factors on the economic result and its distribution.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
In reference to the said objectives and research publications, the following working hypotheses were derived: H 1 : Inequality in the distribution of the economic result of fi eld production businesses is high (the value of the Gini coeffi cient exceeds 0.6), see Witzke and Noleppa (2006) . H 2 : The hectare area of farmed land, i.e. the size of the business, has an eff ect on inequality in the economic result. H 3 : Direct payments do not contribute to more equal distribution of the economic result (Schmid et al., 2006) . H 4 : Subsidies for the support of less favorable areas, agro-environmental subsidies and subsidies for the support of the common organization of the market reduce the inequality in the economic result, as they compensate the production limitation or market limitation of the business. The main methodical apparatus of the submitted article is the quantifi cation of the Gini coeffi cient, which is a commonly used measure of inequality in research focusing on income inequality in society. Stuart (1954) proposed the quantifi cation of the said relative rate by way of covariance between the income level y 1 , …, y n and the cumulative distribution function of income F(Y) with the ascending arrangement of households according to the amount of their income, see formula No. 1.
(1)
For a non-negative income, the Gini coeffi cient quantifi ed by way of the above formula attains values within the interval of <0.1>. However, in the case of the occurrence of a negative income within the analyzed data set, the Gini coeffi cient quantifi ed in the above manner overvalues inequality and achieves a value of more than 1, see Chen et al. (1982) . For example, such a situation occurs in the analyses of income inequality of private individual farmers, or in the examination of inequality in the economic result of legal entities.
The problem of a negative variable (income, profi t, etc.) can be dealt with by way of the adjusted Gini coeffi cient (G*) proposed by Chen et al. (1982) and later modifi ed by Berrebi and Silber (1985) :
In formulas No. 2, No. 3 and No. 4 , n is the total number of examined subjects, j indicates a j-th subject and marks the position of the subject within the set arranged in an ascending manner according to the analyzed variable, Y j is the value of the analyzed variable within the j-th subject, y j is the share of the value of the analyzed variable of the j-th subject in the total value of the analyzed variable within the set. Further, m is the number of subjects for which the cumulative sum of the analyzed variable is negative, whereby for m+1 the cumulative sum of the analyzed variable is already positive. The above applies in the case of the ascending arrangement of subjects according to the values of the analyzed variable. Mishra et al. (2009) add that in the absence of a negative variable within the analyzed data set, the adjusted Gini coeffi cient achieves the same value as its standard version. In the case of a negative variable, G* ≤ G. Mishra et al. (2009) further points out the disadvantages of the adjusted Gini coeffi cient, which are the inability to decompose inequality according to the components of the relevant variable (e.g. types of income, revenues, costs) and the associated problematic calculation of the elasticities of inequality, which measure the impact of a relative change in a component of the analyzed variable on inequality. Boisvert and Ranney (1990) deal with the issue of the quantifi cation of elasticities on the basis of simulation calculations, where, in the fi rst step, they quantify adjusted Gini coeffi cients for an increase in the relevant component by 1%. In the second step, they quantify elasticity according to formula No. 5:
where is the value of the adjusted Gini coeffi cient a er a change of the relevant component and is the value of the adjusted Gini coeffi cient before the given change.
In the submitted article, the primary focus of examination was the inequality of the economic result for the accounting period, which achieves a negative value in many businesses, and thus the analysis of inequality was based on the adjusted Gini coeffi cient. The impact of subsidies on the inequality of the economic result was subsequently assessed with the utilization of elasticities quantifi ed according to formula no. 5. The said Gini coeffi cients were fi rst quantifi ed for individual years of the data set on the basis of the values of the economic result in CZK thousands per business and according to the values of the economic result in CZK thousands per hectare. The purpose was to assess the distortion of the results while not taking into consideration the varying size of the analyzed businesses. This assessment was subsequently also conducted for the values of elasticities of the eff ect of subsidies overall on the inequality of the economic result.
Subsequently, four business size categories were defi ned and inequality within the individual categories was examined. The criterion for the inclusion of a business into the relevant category was the size of farmed agricultural land, whereby the categories were segmented as follows:
• 0-500 ha -small businesses, • 501-1000 ha -mid-size businesses, • 1001-2000 ha -large businesses, • over 2001 ha -largest businesses.
For the said categories, inequality of the economic result for the accounting period was once again quantifi ed according to formula No. 3. In the same methodical manner, inequality in the operating economic result was also quantifi ed. For a more detailed analysis, the Gini coeffi cient of services and service consumption was added, which was quantifi ed according to formula No. 1. In order to assess the factors aff ecting the economic result and its inequality, average values of selected indicators of the fi rst and last quartile, determined according to the values of the economic result for the account period in the year 2009, were defi ned for the said categories of businesses.
The impact of subsidy policy on the inequality of economic result was analyzed with the utilization of the adjusted Gini coeffi cient quantifi ed for the economic result adjusted to not include the subsidy payment for the support of farming in less favorable areas, as well as for the economic result without agro-environmental subsidies and for the economic result without subsidies for the common organization of the market. Elasticities were also quantifi ed for the said three categories of subsidies according to formula No. 5. The elasticity of the Gini coeffi cient was also quantifi ed according to the said formula for a change in total subsidies and direct payments.
Inequality in the drawing of subsidies itself was also analyzed, specifi cally for the categories of total subsidies, direct payments, agro-environmental payments, subsidies for the support of less favorable areas, subsidies for the support of the common organization of the market and subsidies drawn from the Rural Development Program with the exception of those previously mentioned. Because the said categories achieve exclusively positive values, Gini coeffi cients were quantifi ed for them according to formula No. 1.
The conducted analysis was based on panel data from approximately 140 agricultural businesses that engage in the growing of grains, legumes and oilseeds, i.e. fi eld production. The data set was created on the basis of accounting data from the Creditinfo Company Monitor database and from the database of the State Agricultural Intervention Fund. From a time perspective, the said data basis represents the operation of the said agricultural businesses within the years 2005-2010. The data from the accounting statements were also supplemented with the volume of acquired subsidies categorized as follows:
• direct payments (PP) -comprising a sum of SAPS and TOP-UP payments and separate payments for sugar and tomatoes, Further, there was an addition of the size of agricultural land, which was determined as the proportion of the sum of SAPS payments over their annual rate. The number of employees was determined as the proportion of wage costs of individual entities and the average wage in agriculture as attained according to the database of the Czech Statistical Offi ce in the region where the analyzed businesses was located.
Further, the data acquired in the manner as stated above were adjusted to account for incomplete and remote observations, detected with the utilization of graphic analysis. The resulting data set used for analysis contained 927 observations from approximately 140 agricultural businesses. According to the Agrocensus from the year 2010, 686 legal entities engaged in the growing of grains, legumes and oilseeds, i.e. fi eld production, in the Czech Republic. The set of businesses thus comprises approximately 20.4% of the basic set.
All calculations were conducted in MS Excel.
RESULTS

Characteristics of the Set of Businesses
The average hectare area of a business engaging in fi eld production is 794 hectares. Just under 19% of businesses draw a subsidy for an LFA area. In terms of the regional structure, the South Moravian (37%) and Central Bohemian (18.9%) regions are represented the most. The above shows that the analysis comprises businesses operating primarily in favorable, fertile areas. The average value and rate of growth of the selected characteristics of the analyzed agricultural businesses is shown in Tab. I.
Tab. I shows that the hectare area of businesses increased at a moderate rate among the fi rst three size categories, while a decline in hectare area of just under 6% occurred among the largest businesses. The assets per hectare indicator attains the greatest value among small businesses, while the largest businesses achieve the lowest value. A signifi cant decline in the value of assets converted to a per hectare basis occurred among the largest businesses.
Commercial activity, as a supplementary source of income, is engaged in the most by small businesses. Among the largest businesses, the business margin is almost zero when converted to a per hectare basis. The value of the services per hectare indicator is the highest in the small size category, whereas services per hectare are the lowest among the largest businesses. Growth in business services occurred among businesses of all size categories with the exception of mid-size businesses, where there was a slight decline of 1.8%. With the exception of small businesses, there are no great diff erences among the categories for the indicator of service consumption per hectare.
Service consumption per hectare among midsize, large and the largest businesses ranges at levels from CZK 20,000-23,000 per hectare, and at approximately CZK 30,600 per hectare among small businesses. In terms of growth in service consumption, which comprises the greatest portion of costs, small businesses were the hardest hit, with an increase in service consumption per hectare of almost 30%.
The highest added value per hectare was achieved among small businesses, followed by large businesses. The largest businesses, converted to a per hectare basis, achieve the lowest added value. Specifi cally this size category showed a decline in the added value converted to a per hectare basis. Wage costs range from CZK 2,600 per hectare among mid-size businesses up to CZK 5,000 per hectare among small businesses. Depreciation of long-term assets converted to a per hectare basis also decrease with the hectare area of land.
On the basis of the average values of cost items, such as service consumption, wages and depreciation, it may be stated that the largest businesses, as compared to small businesses, achieve savings through economies of scale. However, such fact is not refl ected in the economic result. As the operating economic result when converted to a per hectare basis is the lowest among the largest businesses (CZK 2,500 per hectare) and the highest among the smallest businesses (CZK 3,800 per hectare). Therefore, the economic result per hectare goes down with growth in the hectare area. An increase in the operating economic result per hectare occurred among businesses of all size categories. The fi nancial economic result is negative among businesses of all size categories. The total economic result per hectare is also the lowest among businesses with the largest hectare area, and ranges at a level from CZK 2,700 per hectare to CZK 2,800 per hectare among the other size categories.
Direct payments grew the most among small and mid-size businesses, whereas growth was slower among the large and largest businesses. The growth of agro-environmental subsidies was only among small and mid-size businesses, whereas there was a decline among the large and largest businesses. RDP subsidies besides the said payments are primarily utilized by the large and largest businesses. The profi tability of assets ranges at levels from 3.9% among small businesses up to 5.5% among the large and largest businesses. Without taking into consideration subsidies, the profi tability of assets goes into negative numbers.
Inequality in the Distribution of Economic Result
Field production businesses in the Czech Republic are characterized by a signifi cant inequality in the economic result for the accounting period. The average value of the Gini coeffi cient, quantifi ed from values of the indicator of the economic result for the accounting period (ERAP) in the CZK thousands per business, achieves a level of 0.84 points within the analyzed period. In terms of development in time, signifi cant fl uctuation of inequality is evident, with the lowest value of the Gini coeffi cient in the year 2007. For the analyzed period overall, the Gini coeffi cient shows a decline of 0.046 point for the economic result in CZK thousands per business. In the case of the Gini coeffi cient determined according to values converted to a per hectare basis, that decline is more substantial, specifi cally by 0.078 point.
The diff erence between the values of the Gini coeffi cients is relatively low within the analyzed period. It fl uctuates from 0.001 to 0.043 points. In averaging the values of the Gini coeffi cient for the individual years, the diff erence between the said indicators can be considered negligible.
The choice of indicator also just slightly aff ects the values of elasticities of the Gini coeffi cient, as seen in Tab. II on the example of the eff ect of total subsidies (TS) on the inequality of economic result for the accounting period.
Both methods lead to the conclusion that subsidies just very slightly contribute to a decline in the inequality of economic result. The use of the indicator quantifi ed per hectare just slightly overvalues the eff ect of subsidies, but, nevertheless, the diff erence is, on average, only at a level of 0.0009 percentage points.
Thus, the eff ect of the size of the business on the inequality of the economic result does not appear to be signifi cant. For further verifi cation, the set of businesses was divided up into four size categories according to hectare area and the Gini coeffi cients of the economic result were calculated for each category separately, see Tab. III. In addition, the division into more homogenous groups enabled the Source: Own processing Note: RDP subsidies were not drawn by the analyzed categories of businesses within the same period, and thus the average is determined and the index is quantifi ed only for the category of the largest businesses, which had been drawing them since 2007.
defi nition of factors that could have a share in the given inequality. Tab. III shows that even a er the creation of size categories, the inequality in the distribution of profi t remains relatively high. In the case of small businesses, it is actually even above the average for all businesses and the period (0.8398); the remaining categories are below this average. Of all of the analyzed categories, the average value of the Gini coeffi cient of the economic result for the economic period was the highest among small businesses. The said fact was a result of not only the operating activity of small businesses, but also the remaining area of fi nancial and exceptional activities, for which it was not possible to quantify the Gini coeffi cient because of negative averages, however.
In terms of the operating area, the said category shows a slightly higher inequality of services than service consumption, whereby the inequality of both indicators within the analyzed period shows an increasing tendency. As compared to the other categories, the distribution of all subsidies has the least equal distribution. Small businesses diff er the most in the drawing of payments for LFA and agro-environmental subsidies. The above is caused by a low representation of farms operating in less favorable areas. Out of the analyzed small businesses, only 16% farm on land in an LFA area.
Further, on the basis of Tab. IV, it can be stated that, among the category of small businesses, the inequality in the economic result is not aff ected by the hectare area, or by the volume of subsidies drawn, but by the ability of the business to generate added value, the average amount of which diff ers signifi cantly between the fi rst and last quartile. The unsubstantial eff ect of subsidies on the inequality of the economic result is also evidenced by the elasticities set out in Tab. V.
In the case of mid-size businesses, a decline in the inequality of the economic result occurred within the analyzed period, see Tab. III. As compared to the other categories, there is very little inequality here among businesses in terms of their services and service consumption. Additionally, a trend of gradual convergence can be seen here. Subsidies are also characterized by balanced distribution, primarily in the case of direct payments. The greatest inequality, just as in the case of the previous Source: Own processing category, is seen in the case of subsidies for LFA. In terms of the eff ect of hectare area and the volume of subsidies paid, similar conclusions can be stated as in the case of small businesses. The above disproves hypothesis H 2 . Neither is the diff erence between the average value of the analyzed quartiles signifi cant among indicators of fi xed and current assets. In terms of the factors of production, the businesses are relatively similar to one another, but, nevertheless, they generate a diff erent added value, likely as a result of a diff ering level of success in the assertion of the created production on the market. Large businesses can be characterized as having the lowest inequality of the economic result of all of the size categories, see Tab. III. Services and service consumption among large businesses are not as equally distributed as among mid-size category businesses. A greater dissimilarity is also evident in the area of land farmed, as well as in the total assets, see Tab. IV. For the said category, we thus see the increasing eff ect of the hectare area and volume of drawn subsidy resources on inequality in the distribution of the economic result. The growing eff ect of subsidies on the reduction in inequality of the economic result is also evidence by the values of elasticity in Tab. V.
The largest businesses, as compared to the large ones, show a greater inequality in the distribution of economic result, but with a lesser inequality of services as well as service consumption. However, the factors of production utilized within them diff er signifi cantly. Inequality is thus seen as a consequence of a diff ering level of compensation of the factors of production, management as well as investment activity.
The eff ect of subsidy policy on reducing inequality is the most signifi cant in the said category. Here, subsidies for the support of the common organization of the market, which are utilized the most specifi cally by the largest businesses in view of their availability of storage space, appear to be the most eff ective.
Overall, in terms of the eff ect of subsidies on economic activity, it may be stated that subsidies contribute to a reduction in inequality in the distribution of economic result, see Tab. V. However, their eff ect is very small, although it does grow along with the increasing size of the business. In all size categories of businesses, direct payments contribute to a reduction of inequality in economic result, specifi cally, most signifi cantly out of the analyzed categories of subsidies. Hypothesis H 3 is thus dismissed. The strength of the eff ect of direct payments is likely given by their high proportion among the received subsidy payments.
Of the other categories, agro-environmental subsidies contribute more signifi cantly to reducing inequality than do LFA subsidies. The smallest eff ect on reducing inequality is had by subsidies for the support of the common organization of the market, but with the exception of the category of the largest businesses. The above confi rms the H 4 hypothesis.
DISCUSSION
The distribution of the economic result among the analyzed fi eld production businesses is signifi cantly unequal. The Gini coeffi cients for the economic result indicator converted to a per business basis and converted to a per hectare basis achieve values of 0.84 and 0.83 points. Similar conclusions were also reached by Witzke and Noleppa (2006) , who conducted an analysis of the inequality in the economic result of 481 businesses (legal entities) in Germany. If, on the basis of the construction of income from agricultural activity according to FADN, we proceed from the similarity of the categories of profi t and agricultural income, then Severini and Tantari (2012) also reach similar conclusions. This conclusion is not surprising. The economic result is not only strongly aff ected by the size of the business, the ability of the management, and the investment activity of the business, but also by the weather and exceptional events.
The fi nding that subsidies have a slight share in the reduction of inequality of income contradicts the publication of Schmid et al. (2006) and, on the other hand, supports the conclusions of Benni and Finger (2012) or Severini and Tantari (2012) . The authors also reach the conclusion that direct payments paid out within the fi rst pillar reduce inequality in income. The reason is that the inequality in the distribution of subsidies is lesser than the inequality in the distribution of income that is generated by the market itself. They also state that their eff ect on the balancing of income is derived from the fact that they have little correlation to income level.
In terms of subsidies within the second pillar (LFA and agro-environmental subsidies), Severini a Tantari (2012) reach the conclusion that they have a much more unequal distribution and also that they have a lesser share in the total income of the business. Their eff ect on income inequality is therefore negligible. They emphasize that any reduction in direct payments within the fi rst pillar will bring about an increase in inequality in the distribution of income. Also, transfers of resources from the fi rst pillar to the second pillar do not have to lead to a greater balance in income.
CONCLUSION
The submitted article defi ned a high inequality in the distribution of the economic result among fi eld production businesses in the Czech Republic. However, a direct correlation between the size of the business and the size of the economic result was not established here. The account data shows that although the largest businesses achieve savings through economies of scale, they are not able to convert them into subsequent profi t. Despite the fact that the average amount of the economic result of small and the largest businesses in values per business and per hectare thus diff ers signifi cantly, it is not possible to defi ne signifi cant diff erences among the quantifi ed values of the Gini coeffi cients. Therefore, in further analyses, the results of the Gini coeffi cients from values per business and values per hectare can be considered comparable. The eff ect of size was not positively established even on the basis of the quantifi cation of the Gini coeffi cients for homogenous groups of businesses in terms of hectare area, because even businesses with a comparable hectare area showed signifi cant diff erences in economic result. The disparity in the economic result is thus not based on the variability of the factors of production that the businesses have available, but rather on the ability of their management.
CAP instruments in the form of subsidies do not have a signifi cant eff ect on the distribution of economic result either. The quantifi ed elasticities do show a positive redistribution eff ect, but, nevertheless, its strength is very low. Primarily the eff ect of direct payments appears to be surprising, as they, despite being primarily comprised of subsidies tied to farmed land, contribute to the balancing of economic result. The eff ect of the analyzed subsidy titles grows stronger along with the growing size of the analyzed businesses, and thus it may be expected that setting any ceilings for direct payments will have a negative eff ect on the distribution of economic result within businesses of over 1000 hectares. The specifi c impact requires a more detailed analysis, which will be the subject of further research.
SUMMARY
The goal of the submitted article is to analyze inequality in the distribution of the economic result among businesses engaging in fi eld production in the Czech Republic and to assess the impact of subsidies on the said inequality. A partial goal is the assessment of the eff ect of selected factors on the economic result and its distribution. Last but not least, the article also deals with the distortion of the rate of inequality as a result of a failure to take into consideration the size heterogeneity of the analyzed businesses. From a methodical perspective, the assessment of inequality is based on the quantifi cation of the Gini coeffi cient and its adjusted version. The eff ect of subsidies on the distribution of the economic result is analyzed with the utilization of the elasticity of the Gini coeffi cient. The data basis are the accounting data of 140 agricultural businesses that engage in fi eld production, acquired from the Creditinfo Company Monitor database and database of the State Agricultural Intervention Fund for the period of the years 2005-2010. The results evidence a high inequality in the distribution of the economic result among fi eld production businesses in the Czech Republic. The Gini coeffi cient for the analyzed period shows an average level of 0.84 points. The conducted analysis shows that the said inequality is not a result of the diff ering size of individual businesses, nor of the variability of the other factors of production that businesses have available, but rather of the ability of their management. CAP instruments in the form of subsidies do not have a signifi cant eff ect on the distribution of the economic result either. The quantifi ed elasticities do show a positive redistribution eff ect, but, nevertheless, its strength is very low. The elasticity of all of the analyzed subsidies on average in the analyzed period only achieved a value of −0.0063%. Evidently surprising is primarily the eff ect of direct payments, which, despite the fact that they primarily consist of subsidies tied to farmed land, contribute to the balancing of the economic result. The eff ect of the analyzed subsidy titles grows stronger with the growing size of the analyzed businesses. The largest businesses show a 0.0043 percentage point higher elasticity of direct payments than small businesses. From the said viewpoint, it may be assumed that any ceilings set for direct payments will have a negative eff ect on the distribution of the economic result within businesses of over 1000 hectares.
